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During the last decade, an increasing share of 
foreign aid has been provided to countries coming 
out of civil war or experiencing severe conflict. Most 
of these countries—like the Republic of Congo, 
Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia—suffer 
from a combination of conflict, a state in crisis, 
underdevelopment, and poverty. Under most 
circumstances, poverty is greatly exacerbated by 
conflict, but it is also one of a number of factors that 
may contribute to violent conflict. Addressing what 
Frances Stewart has called “horizontal inequalities” 
is, therefore, likely to play a role in preventing the 
shift from grievance to violence, as well as in 
building and sustaining peace in postwar situations. 
In several countries that have suffered from 
protracted conflict, however, an approach focused 
on poverty has been slow to emerge. To a large 
extent, peace-building missions have become state-
building missions, first, because “fragile states” are 
seen as a risk both for their society and for 
international security and, second, because it is 
broadly assumed that one vital condition for 
sustainable peace is that the state apparatus has the 
capacity to exercise core functions of statehood in 
an efficient, nonviolent, and legitimate way. In the 
process, however, the extent to which the poverty 
and marginalization of large rural populations have 
spurred recent wars has been underestimated. As a 
consequence, donors and policymakers risk 
rebuilding the causes of war. 
This brief uses examples from Sudan and 
Afghanistan to highlight the role that land issues 
have played both in causing poverty and in driving 
and sustaining protracted conflict. In both countries, 
a number of interconnected conflicts have global 
reach, as well as occurring at regional, national, and 
local levels. For example, conflicts over water and 
grazing rights in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan 
have become entwined with political rivalries on a 
larger scale, even including neighboring countries. 
In a similar fashion, efforts by foreign troops to 
track down remnants of Al-Qaida and Taliban forces 
in Afghanistan have become entangled with localized 
conflicts. A great challenge, therefore, is to identify 
which particular types of interventions affect the 
different levels and dimensions of current conflicts. 
This is a tall order, but it seems safe to conclude 
that the international community has not yet 
responded adequately to the challenge. In 
Afghanistan, postwar reconstruction efforts have 
been focused on establishing an effective central 
state that operates under the rule of law and in 
accordance with principles of transparency and 
accountability. While the U.S.–led coalition has 
invested heavily in military efforts, aid strategies 
have created a state that depends on foreign funds 
and military forces for its survival. In the process, 
the role that rural land issues have played in driving 
and sustaining internal conflict has been 
insufficiently considered. In Sudan, the international 
community has been drawn into continuous crisis 
management because of Darfur, as well as the slow 
and very difficult implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 
2005 between the Government of Sudan and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. As one 
consequence, there is less concern with the patterns 
of development that have been and are being 
pursued in Sudan, and the way in which they may 
promote or reduce poverty. In both countries, land 
use is a key grievance that fuels a number of local 
and regional conflicts. 
Sudan 
Civil war has been fought in Sudan for most of the 
period since independence in 1956, with only a brief 
spell of peace from 1972 to 1983. After the signing 
of the CPA, two other peace agreements were 
concluded in 2006: the Darfur Peace Agreement and 
the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement. The 
international community has provided substantial 
funds for the implementation of the CPA; however, 
due to the continued crisis in Darfur and continued 
unrest and lack of basic services in the south, the 
bulk of donor aid to Sudan has so far been directed 
to humanitarian assistance. Successive Khartoum 
governments have argued, as they do now for 
Darfur, that violence is caused by local-level, ethnic 
conflicts mainly arising from pressure on a 
diminishing resource base. However, the civil strife 
that has spread throughout many parts of Sudan 
since the 1980s should be seen as part of a pattern 
of violence in which the Sudanese state—as a 
vehicle for special interest groups—has played a 
major role.  
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Historically, state resources have been 
concentrated in the central Nile areas in the north, 
reflecting the longstanding political dominance of 
groups from this area. A process of uneven 
development and economic dislocation began during 
the colonial period and became massive in the 
1970s. The shift from subsistence agriculture to 
export-oriented, mechanized agriculture had its 
greatest impact in the so-called Transition Zone 
between north and south—along southern Kordofan, 
southern Darfur, Blue Nile, and the Sudan–Ethiopian 
border region—resulting in the dispossession of 
smallholder farmers from their customary rights to 
land, the erosion of the land-use rights of 
pastoralists, and the creation of a large force of 
agricultural wage laborers, whose numbers were 
increased through displacement by drought and war 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  
This process generated important benefits for a 
key political constituency, mainly in Khartoum. It 
also created serious structural problems in the 
agricultural sector. The rate of increase in 
production has been declining and many areas have 
high food insecurity. A major grievance has been 
land use. The area of land under mechanized 
farming increased from around 2 million feddans at 
the beginning of the 1970s to some 14 million 
feddans by 2003 (1 feddan equals 1.038 acres). A 
vital factor here was the passage of laws 
undermining the control that local authorities and 
local people were able to exert over land. This 
process was accelerated by the National Islamic 
Front regime after it came to power in 1989. Policies 
have also been divisive at local and regional levels, 
creating growing regional subcultures of ethnic 
violence. 
From the 1970s onward, the agricultural growth 
model adopted in Sudan gave little or no 
consideration to those who were displaced or 
otherwise affected, whether in Darfur, among the 
Nuba in southern Kordofan, or among the Beja in 
eastern Sudan. It is no coincidence, therefore, that 
aside from Khartoum—which saw major violence 
following the death of John Garang and occasionally 
suffers from confrontations between groups—most 
of the violence has taken place in rural (pastoral and 
agropastoral) areas. Populations from these areas 
also constitute the main source of street children, 
poor female-headed households, displaced persons, 
and refugees. They come from three broad regions: 
the areas struck by drought and famine during the 
1970s and 1980s, the areas that saw an expansion 
of mechanized farming during the same period, and 
the former “closed districts” of the colonial period, 
such as south Sudan.  
Changes in rights to land and its use represent 
fundamental transformations in Sudanese society. 
Their effects will not be removed by the signing of 
peace accords. In addition to various obstacles to 
improved productivity and access to markets, land 
issues have far-reaching consequences for rural 
poverty and development, as well as for local, 
regional, and national conflicts. Thus, in Darfur the 
inability of land ownership and land management 
systems to cope with the demand for agricultural 
land and pasture has been a key element of the 
often deadly conflicts, also between different Arab 
groups. Illegal land occupation has also been an 
integral part of the crisis. It is also a critical issue in 
eastern Sudan, where the loss of traditionally owned 
land to mechanized agricultural schemes has 
undermined the sustainability of the pastoralist 
livelihoods of the predominant group in the region, 
the Beja, and pushed many Beja to settle in urban 
slums, particularly in Port Sudan. In the south, land 
rights have become increasingly disputed as 
refugees and internationally displaced persons start 
returning, and oil exploration continues in new 
areas. 
While Sudan is becoming wealthier because of 
oil exports, rural poverty is accentuated because 
spending on social services has been among the 
lowest in the world. The poor track record on 
development spending is paralleled by a very limited 
capacity at state and local levels to plan and 
manage projects. As a result, poverty and human 
deprivation in all probability worsened over the past 
decade. 
Afghanistan 
Afghanistan shares Sudan’s long history of war, 
displacement, and drought, with continued armed 
conflict since 1978. Several factors affect the 
continuation of conflict despite the ousting of the 
Taliban regime in 2001. Often overlooked is the 
importance of conflict arising from land issues and 
how these tie in with the postwar structure of 
political economy.  
According to the latest report from the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2007), 
Afghanistan currently produces 90 percent of the 
world’s heroin. Part of the explanation for both the 
increasing conflict level and the sharp increase in 
poppy production since 2002 relates to land issues. 
Most Afghans depend at least in part on agriculture 
for their livelihood, but a significant proportion are 
either landless or are farming plots that are too 
small to generate adequate income. A high degree 
of uncertainty exists over landownership, particularly 
in sharecropping and the closely related practice of 
land mortgaging; there is no regime to manage land 
rights and disputes beyond local councils dominated 
by local power holders; and the policy and legal 
framework to regulate the use and transfer of 
substantial state landholdings is also highly 
inadequate.  
Previous governments have tried to introduce 
land reform, including a king (in the 1920s), a 
president (in the early 1970s), and a communist 
government (in the late 1970s). The most radical 
attempt was by the government of the Soviet-
backed People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
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following the coup d’état in 1978. However, such 
reforms led to armed revolt with strong backing 
from the conservative and traditionalist religious 
networks and landowners. Following the Soviet 
invasion in 1979, armed resistance was primarily 
mounted in rural areas, with mujahideen forces 
operating within the population and from their bases 
in Pakistan and Iran. A combination of targeted 
destruction and lack of maintenance following the 
outflow of 5 million Afghans to neighboring countries 
destroyed much of the underground irrigation 
systems—the kareezes. Drug production started to 
pick up as it required less water and was not 
discouraged by the international backers, both 
Western and Islamic, who supported the resistance 
with funding and arms. The commanders emerging 
in the resistance parties were frequently religious 
leaders or landowners able to command people 
through religious or financial bonds. When these 
parties assumed power in Kabul in 1992, they were 
neither willing nor able to address land issues. 
Rather, they used their military power to increase 
their own holdings. 
The Taliban movement that emerged in 
southern Afghanistan in 1994 restored the rights of 
land and property confiscated by commanders, but 
the Taliban did not establish a functional 
government and administration, nor were they 
willing to address land issues. Hoping for 
international recognition and using religious 
arguments, they banned the production and 
processing of drugs, knowing that this would reduce 
the income of many farmers and seasonal workers.  
Following the military defeat of the Taliban in 
late 2001, rapid change was on the horizon. With an 
elected president and parliament, national plans and 
international funding to promote development, and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to provide 
military security, Afghans hoped that they had seen 
the end of both poverty and violence. Expectations 
were high, as the Afghans were to be rewarded for 
assisting in the “war on terror.” However, as part of 
the settlement, the former commanders returned 
and regained influence, lands, and properties. The 
Taliban, primarily drawn from the poorest rural 
areas in the south, were excluded from peace 
negotiations and the new government and opted to 
continue their military struggle. 
Leaving security aside, land issues remain 
largely unaddressed in Afghanistan, and very limited 
efforts have been made to improve and increase 
agricultural production and ensure food security. 
According to a 2007 report by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 6.5 
million out of an estimated population of 27 million 
face food insecurity. The priority has rather been to 
strengthen the central administration in Kabul and 
initiate projects with high visibility. “The outcome in 
the agricultural sector is not easily and quickly 
visible and measurable to the donors,” was the 
explanation provided by a senior adviser to the 
Minister of Agriculture.  
With 4.8 million Afghans returning from Iran  
and Pakistan since 2002, pressure on land and 
unemployment has sharply increased. Problems 
have been exacerbated by corruption, ethnic 
tension, and arbitrary use of power by local 
strongmen. Large landholdings have been 
transferred to a few well-connected persons. 
Moreover, the present pattern of landownership, 
powerful commanders/landowners, and high 
availability of unemployed young men provide ideal 
conditions for drug production and warfare. When a 
poor sharecropper knows he has to pay as much as 
50 percent of his yield to the landowner, he will 
select the produce that provides the highest 
outcome—if given a choice. When the government 
and the international forces threaten to eradicate 
the harvest, many see no option but to join the 
insurgency to protect their livelihood.  
Policy Implications 
An approach that focuses on poverty and gives due 
consideration to land issues and livelihood support 
has been slow to emerge in the postwar 
reconstruction of both Sudan and Afghanistan. In 
both countries, the lack of economic development in 
the rural areas negatively affects the perception that 
the population has of the international community’s 
intervention. 
In Afghanistan, it is difficult to envisage any 
possibilities for building sustained peace until 
landownership, agricultural production, and rural 
employment are properly addressed. Years of 
misdirected policy have entrenched deeply 
inequitable landownership relations among tribes, 
between agricultural and pastoral systems, and 
among feudally arranged classes of society. These 
challenges have not yet been adequately recognized 
among donors in Kabul despite the existence of rural 
programs funded by the World Bank, U.S. Agency 
for International Development, and others. Growing 
insecurity, massive corruption, and the expanding 
drug economy have diverted the attention of both 
donors and the Afghan government and reinforced 
the mantras of the importance of state building and 
“good governance” as priority areas for 
development. 
In Sudan, alienation of land as part of processes 
of marginalization and increasing poverty has been a 
key determinant of conflict, but there is an absence 
of an overall framework to deal with the problems 
with the necessary urgency. True, funds have been 
allocated for a number of programs targeting rural 
populations in the areas of health and education, 
mainly in southern Sudan. Agricultural development 
has received little attention so far, and a striking 
feature of current aid to Sudan is the lack of 
priorities related to an understanding and critique of 
the patterns of development that have been and are 
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being pursued. Given that the influx of revenues 
from oil exports may consolidate a “rentier” state 
that renders it less accountable to its population, the 
prospects for reducing poverty and inequities—and, 
for that matter, promoting democratic forms of 
development—may not be encouraging.  
Despite similarities, Sudan and Afghanistan are 
of course different, and so it is important to look at 
context and particular settings before identifying 
strategies. The conclusions offered here, therefore, 
must be of a more general kind, emphasizing the 
following issues.  
First, on a general level, a blend of approaches 
is essential in order to promote sustainable peace 
building. On the one hand, it is important to build 
state capacities, and a strong, accountable state is 
best when it comes to alleviating persistent conflict 
and the chronic poverty it generates, protecting 
entitlements, and providing health care and 
education. On the other hand, peace will not be 
achieved unless the grievances of the marginalized 
and the benefits accruing from violence are 
addressed. Recent research clearly indicates that 
low levels of development adversely affect the 
chances of successful peace building, whereas 
patterns of development that meet the needs of 
ordinary people may weaken the position of 
warlords, extremist politicians, and leaders who offer 
to meet these needs through more violent means.  
Second, land rights management is a 
cornerstone of social management and poverty 
reduction in agrarian states like Sudan and 
Afghanistan. While both countries share the need for 
an overall framework for land management, it must 
also be recognized that the problems differ, and that 
the adoption of localized and community-based 
approaches is essential. As Liz Wiley suggests in 
Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in 
Afghanistan, addressing problems only through new 
law or new policy cannot have much success in the 
often lawless conditions that operate beyond the 
reach of the current administration. 
 Finally, most international investment in peace 
building has happened at the state level. Despite 
political and other constraints, there is both scope 
and need for local-level peace building and 
reconciliation work and for rebuilding state–society 
relations through bottom-up processes. Aid 
strategies need to be designed to support such 
processes. In Sudan and Afghanistan, this would 
include addressing land issues that may underpin 
the recovery process and also provide opportunities 
to bring about changes in governance through 
development of systems that are fairer to the 
poorest and most marginalized communities. It also 
implies that policymakers must pay more attention 
to low-intensity and local conflicts. These struggles 
are often over access to agricultural and pastoral 
resources and can establish pockets of discontent, 
reduce food production, flare up into greater 
conflicts, or be linked to other, larger scale conflicts. 
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